Contemporary national-populism in Scandinavia*
Identifying types and determining factors

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ABSTRACT. This is a short, comparative paper about the contemporary National-Populist parties in the three largest Scandinavian countries. In it, the author argues that the label ‘National-Populist’ best describes the parties in Scandinavia. Furthermore, an identification is made of two main types of populist movements in the region and the general ideological developments are traced in order to identify which are shared, and which differ, among the parties in question. It also treats some of the factors that are likely to have caused the shared history and features of parties across the region, such as linguistic similarity, the states’ creation of an additional, regionalist level of nationalist feeling, and other socio-economic developments.

KEYWORDS: National-Populism, right-wing populism, Scandinavia

Introduction

The 2019 electoral campaign by a newly founded Danish political party, Stram Kurs (Hard Line), saw its leader, who has a previous conviction of racism to his name, express the idea that all Muslims should be deported, irrespective of their nationality and ethnical background. To many, including to Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Copenhagen, Christian Erik J. Kock, this campaign was a clear case of “bullshit rhetoric”; meaning to say that Rasmus Paludan was much more interested in creating a sensation with his offensive public statements and youtube clips of his significant police escorts and addresses to angry, mostly muslim, crowds, than in expressing a consistent political conviction (Borelli, 2019) (1). How are we to understand this political factor, and the factor of all the other national-populist parties in Scandinavian countries? To many, and foremost to Scandinavians themselves, this particular region in the Northern periphery of Europe is synonymous with stories of
welfare successes, happy populations, and high living standards. However, cracks in the surface of
the decidedly welfarist societies started to show already decades ago, and Scandinavia is changing
its political face. So-called right-wing populist parties are founded. Some of them come to a quick
demise while others become stable and highly influential political forces to be reckoned with.
Although the political stances of some of the most recently founded political parties in the region
have come as a surprise to many, we ask the question of whether these developments were really
so unexpected. Indeed, in recent decades we have seen a remarkable increase in the number of
populist parties and movements especially in Europe, although their electoral successes have been
sporadic. Particularly in some Scandinavian countries, their once shocking rhetoric and policies,
that used to be considered extremist, have become almost mainstream (Mudde, 2004, p. 550).
We seek here to determine what right-wing, or anti-immigration, populism in contemporary
Scandinavia is, how we may best categorise it, and finally to test the hypothesis that there is
something in the nature of the Scandinavian political landscape that renders it particularly fruitful
ground for the proliferation and stability of populist parties of this kind.

Populist terminology

Numerous scholars have drawn the conclusion that the term ‘populist’ is used, both in the media and
in academia, to refer to a range of phenomena too wide to be encompassed in a single definition (2).
Conceptual confusion is certainly the result of this practice.
According to Isaiah Berlin most scholars would agree that a single formula to cover all populisms
everywhere would not be helpful. “The more embracing the formula, the less descriptive”.
Viceversa, “the more richly descriptive the formula, the more it will exclude”. That is the idea of
“Platonic populism”, all the others being “dilutions of it or perversions of it”.
Berlin was of the opinion that whenever a word is much used, even if it is an exceedingly confusing
word, “something real is intended; something, not quite nothing”. Eventually, “there is a sense in
which one should look for the common core” (Berlin, 1961, p. 114, 136, 139). Pierre-André Taguieff
noted that while the suggestion has repeatedly been made that the concept of populism must be
erased from the vocabulary of the social sciences because it confounds our perception of the real
underlying problems of society and becomes a kind of rouse. However, the exponential growth
of interest in the topic, and the familiarity with which the concept continues to appear as self-
explanatory in public discourse, make its obliteration impossible to achieve (Taguieff, 1997, pp.
4-7). Not all scholars view negatively the vagueness of the concept of populism. Yves Mény and
Yves Surel, for example, see its ambiguity as constitutive (Meny, Surel, 2002) and Paul Taggart
saw populism as the most effective remedy against the pathologies of representative politics
(Taggart, 2002) (3). We shall, as suggested by Canovan and others, partially rely on the notion of
‘family resemblance’ (Familienähnlichkeit), one of paramount importance for Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy in as far as categorising different populist phenomena is concerned (4). These are
sometimes “overall similarities”, sometimes “similarities of detail”. The ability of populist political
parties in Scandinavia to gain electoral success, and hence to stabilise, is an element suggesting
that populism in Scandinavia may either be the result of a peculiar type of diversification within
populism, or a result of effects of the so-called Scandinavian model of politics. In case the latter
is true, Scandinavia must be regarded, after all, as a somewhat fertile ground for populists of
different kinds. Furthermore, we shall have a look at some of the factors that are likely to have
caused the shared history and features of parties across the region, such as linguistic similarity, the states’ creation of an additional, regionalist aspect of nationalist feeling, and other socio-economic developments.

In Scandinavian countries the tendency to, oftentimes indiscriminately, make use of a plethora of different categories when referring to populist movements and parties is strong. We see that parties call themselves Folkparti (Party of the People, or People’s Party), Sverigedemokratar (Sweden Democrats) and yet, they are called ‘right-wing populist parties’, or ‘radical right parties’ by scholars, journalists and media commentators. Rather than a lack of definitions or of failing definitions, the problem seems to be rooted in how scholars and analysts tend to take one or several specific cases as their starting point for a definition. This strategy is legitimate, but it introduces complications whenever an attempt is made to amplify its heuristic validity.

Moreover, some definitions of populism are so far-reaching that it becomes difficult to tell populist parties apart from other types of parties. Nevertheless, core, populist traits appear to be shared among different parties and organisations throughout the world, especially in democratic countries (5).

While these widespread phenomena take different forms under different circumstances, they are generally critical of elitism and liberal-democratic pluralism. In fact, the wish is to either limit liberal-democracy, to implement different, more participatory, variants of democracy, or to exchange the democratic political elite for another.

Isaiah Berlin, whose writings make it possible for us to bring populism and nationalism together, tells us that populism, according to him, has at its basis a notion of an integrated and cohesive society, a disinterest for political institutions and a superstitious belief in society. It strives towards a previous condition which is believed to have existed before the perceived crisis, it strives to revive traditional norms and values, and it refers to the ‘will of the people’. This definition could be a definition both of populism and of nationalism, with the exception that nationalism specifically strives to maintain, or create, a nation-state.

**Economic and political factors**

After the cold war, populations were promised a move away from an excessive focus on party- or bloc-politics, where the aim was to promote one’s own ideology and ideal society, and towards a society of scientific advancement and economic prosperity. Scandinavia was the crowning glory in as much as several political parties, and even entire political systems, in this region strove for political inclusion (as the low cut-offs for parliamentary representation, at only 2% of the votes indicates) and consensus seeking, thus effectively eliminating true political conflict for several decades. As new security threats and economic crisis showed their ugly face on the one hand, and national politics seemed unable, or unwilling, to effectively deal with these threats, the populations lost patience with their leaders, thinking either that they could do a better job themselves, or that a new political elite with different visions of politics were needed. Geoff Mulgan, possibly with prescriptive outcome, points out many of these tendencies (Mulgan, 1994). To another group of scholars, populism represents only a ‘tactical device’ or a ‘style of communication’ (Jagers, Walgrave, 2007; De Raadt et al., 2014, p. 6). After all, a certain general terminology and way of speaking about the people is employed by populists. They often speak about ‘the people’ and ‘the citizen’, but they also use specific, commonly occurring characteristics of individuals to represent much larger portions of the electorate. For example, ‘nurse Cat’ could be employed to signify the anything from
the average health sector employee, anyone working in shifts, a typical single-mother, or anyone with a higher vocational education level, depending on the context. Van de Raadt et al. also mention that populists, where they make appeals to independence, may also employ ethnic distinctions, linguistic traits, and/or regional references.

The Scandinavian countries have enjoyed centralised government and administration for a long time already. This has contributed to promoting national pride and the popular belief in the nation as being, if not primordial, then perennial. Moreover, so-called ‘banale nationalism’ is reproduced on a large scale in the Scandinavian context and we know that populist parties exist in the region. Some of the parties have been successful, others less so. We must now turn our gaze to these parties in order to understand, first of all, what kind of populist party they are and they relate to some specific characteristics of the regional and national political landscape. Finally, we will also consider the success of each of the parties and try to understand what has caused it, or what has undermined it. In Scandinavia, as in other Western European realities, based on their largely rural societies, there were, traditionally three types of political parties before 1970; an agrarian party (6), an urban-based liberal party, and a moderately right-wing conservative party. In Western Europe, the socio-economic profile of the peasant has changed dramatically and the era of industrialisation has come and gone, leaving large parts of the urbanised population ‘behind’ as industrialisation, automatization, and globalisation has taken hold of all facets of production - rural or urban. Their electoral base for many new political parties are thus the (former) industrial workers, those who work in the public sectors that are under pressure from liberal, neo-liberal, and socio-democratic governments, such as health and education professionals, those who work in sectors that are under pressure from (work) migration, and lastly, the unemployed.

We will also consider the presumption that many of the populist parties loose support once they join government. We may, on the one hand, consider that some of the populist parties, such as the People’s Party of Denmark and the Swedish New Right did not loose the support of the electoral base after joining the government. Is this a sign that they have been successful in re-inventing their own image from a protest – to a responsible party? On the other hand, we acknowledge that populist parties that have policies which are irreconcilable with current democratic processes, or where their electorate will immediately recognise them as corrupt if they join government, will loose their electoral base as a result. Anders Hellström analyses the three main national populist parties in Scandinavia that have all managed to become a stable presence, although with large fluctuations in electoral success; the Swedish Sverigedemokratarna [SD], the Danish Dansk Folkeparti [DF], and the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet [FrP]. He concludes that the SD and the DF “used national myths to attempt to cross the threshold of credibility,” but that the FrP did not, at least in their party programmes, appeal to national myths (Hellström, 2016). This begs the question of why the FrP does not make the appeal to national myths while the other two parties do. Moreover, the perceived political enemy of the typical electorate in Scandinavia is no longer to be found in specific neighbouring countries, but in the European Union, which embodies the idea of the exploitative, bureaucratic and impersonal democracy, with its highly educated elite which corrupts the efforts of the “real” citizens. It is also true that the Scandinavian country which has had an empiricist history, Denmark, has spent the last centuries trying to carefully balance the costs and benefits, not to mention the ethical questions related to governing non-national territory. The other perceived enemy are to current and past national governments that are responsible in many people’s eyes, of bringing the war on terrorism to their doorsteps. Let us have a look at the different national contexts of the three largest Scandinavian countries.
The three national contexts

Denmark is known for having (extreme) minority governments (7). Government formation after the 1973 elections was especially chaotic (Kaarsted, 1988). The outcome was a liberal minority government, based on only 22 of the 179 seats in Folketinget, but that was not the most significant novelty. The first populist party in Denmark, Fremskridtspartiet [DFrP], entered Folketinget for the first time, with no less than 28 delegates. The party had been founded by the tax lawyer, Mogens Glistrup, in August 1972, after a short appearance on television in which he declared that he had been able to pay zero income taxes. To define the party, we must use vocabulary such as 'libertarian', 'popular' and 'grassroot organisation'. The party, at the outset only really have one objective: to diminish taxation, and all its other policy points were an effect of this (8). In more constructive terms, the policies of the party during the first years were the gradual abolishment of income tax, the dismantling of bureaucracy and the majority of the civil service, as well as the simplification of legislation. In the years following the 1975 election, in which DFrP lost a few seats, Glistrup incorporated an anti-islamic stance into DFrP policy. He quite literally stated that one of his purposes was to have Denmark free of ‘Mohammedanes’, a term forged by Glistrup himself. During Glistrup’s spell in prison for tax-evasion, some of the other party members, and especially Pia Kjærsgaard, gained a strong position within the party, which eventually led to a split within the party. On her watch, several agreements were made with government and when Glistrup refused to second the agreements upon his return, he was withdrawn as an MP by the party he had founded. Disgruntled, Mogens Glistrup ended up leaving the party to start another party, Trivselspartiet. The internal disagreements did not end there though, and in 1995, a group of DFrP MPs, led by the former nurse, Pia Kjaersgaard, broke away from the party, forming instead the Dansk Folkeparti. In 1999, Glistrup was invited back as the leader of the party, but he made such offensive statements against muslims, that the other MPs, by then only four, left to form yet another party, the Frihed 2000. In the 2001 election, the DFrP had lost almost all its backing and could not muster enough support to enter parliament (Valbum, 2008). Pia Kjaersgaard, together with a few other prominent former Progress Party members, founded Danks Folkeparti (DF), or the Danish Party of the People (9). Yet another minority government followed in the 1978 elections. This tendency of short-lived, minority governments continued, and with very few expections, the DF was mostly invited to support the government. Although minority governments were common also before 1973, the volatility of the external supportive alliances increased noticeably. So much, in fact, that they are the most frequent cause of the fall of government (Damgaard, 1992).

Returning specifically to the DF, we note that the party has, generally done well in elections and was, up to the 2019 political elections, the second largest party in parliament with 37 mandates out of 179. To find out a bit more about the policies of the party, as well as the rhetorical style it employs in its promotional material, we read the current Programme, written in 2009. The opening statement sets the patriotic tone: “Denmark is the land of the Danes. The continued existence of our little country as a stable democracy is depending on that our population-mix will not be changed to an extensive degree”. Then it goes on to suggest local solutions to migration problems and famine. About the population in Third World countries it states that “they can only obtain stable conditions through adopting significant cultural traits from the Western World, i.e. liberty, democratisation, equality, knowledge, economic reforms and a reduction in the population growth”. The tone is really quite spiteful when it says that “…we do not want to be forced to accept the immigration of
people who despise the cultural principles that have created our country and who cannot provide for themselves”. We also recognise that the party perceives immigration as a threat to the societal structure as such:

«The redistributive principle and the idea of equality behind our welfare model is completely incomprehensible for most cultures… There is no logic in changing our society radically, so that the standards of living are adapted to people who fled or migrated from the standards of living that they have at home. It is not Denmark that is in the wrong, it is not Danish culture or societal structure that is in need of change – if that were the case, so many people would not be trying to come here and to get a residence permit» (Dansk Folkeparti, 2009, p. 1662) (10).

Here, we recognise the construction of the idea of a ‘heartland’. Furthermore, in the introduction to their political programme, the current leader of Dansk Folkeparti refers to a right to a sense of familiarity and security within the national borders, based on the idea that all Danes share the same values and traditions. It seems to be the nation as extended family (11). The feeling of connectedness with the other Scandinavian nations is also an important feature of the DF world-view. At the same time, DF is a nationalist party in a multi-national realm, which includes both Greenland and the Faeroer (12). Many of DF’s proposals have, usually after vivid public debate and some revision, been passed, and the former party chairman and founder of DF, Pia Kjørsgaard, is the current Speaker of Folketinget (13). The 2019 political elections in Denmark, the Faeroe Islands and Greenland saw the participation of no less than 13 Danish parties, 6 parties from the Faeroe Islands, and 7 parties from Greenland. A total thus of 26 parties rivalling for 179 seats in the Danish parliament.

As regards the ‘banal nationalism’ which one may witness in Scandinavia, it includes all aspects of life; in Denmark it is everything from the traditional birthday song with its accompanying small national flags that greet each individual on the morning of their birthday, over the traditional ‘burning of a witch’ on mid-summer night, to the routine reference in talkshows and TV programmes to “us, the Danish” or “the small kingdom of Denmark”. Besides these everyday signals, there are proper institutions and projects of nationalism. The latest of which features Prince Joachim, the second in the line of succession to the Danish throne, casted in the role of amateur historian in a short TV series, where he searches Danish history for the routes of what created Danish society as it is today; complete with Viking history, historical artifacts from the time of the reformation, and a celebration of the Christian history of the country (Danmarks Radio, 2019) (14).

In Norway, already in the 1960, the political agrarian agitation, Anders Lange, had been touring the country with his ideas of the minimal state. It was only, however, in April 1973 that Anders Lange established his ‘minimal state’ party which, following the model of the DFrP, founded by Mogen Glistrup, wanted minimum state intervention and drastic cuts on taxation. Also in Norway, like in Denmark, the general election of 1973 saw the fragmentation of the party system (Rommetvedt, 1992, pp. 52-56). Anders Lange passed away within a year after having established his party. After his death, his party adopted a new name, Fremskrittspartiet, or the Progress Party (FrP). The FrP was initially placed behind a cordon sanitaire, partially because of its populism and partially because the government could afford to leave it out. As we remember, the Danish minority governments were not in a position where they could completely ignore the DFrP mandates. It entered parliament only in the 1985 elections with two pivotal seats. This was far form the initial electoral success the Danish sister party had the same year.
With the support of the FrP MPs, the conservative government could stay. Thus, the moment the party entered parliament, it was much discussed and could exert influence on government policy from the outset. But the happy union only lasted until 1986, when the FrP joined the opposition in a no confidence vote. In 1989, when a right-wing coalition received the expressed support of the FrP, the second Brundtland cabinet resigned. The programme of the FrP has consistently mirrored that of the DF: significant tax cuts, less bureaucracy, and market liberalism. It eventually also adopted the anti-immigration message of the Danish sister party. The electoral support of the FrP has been steadily increasing, at least until the party entered government after the 2013 elections. What has characterised the party’s time in government, has been its focus on symbolic cases that created a disproportionate amount of press coverage, but would have little impact on people’s everyday lives. An important difference between the general political landscapes in Norway on the one hand and Sweden and Denmark on the other, is that public opinion is much less tolerant in Norway than in the other larger Scandinavian countries, in terms of potentially hurtful remarks made in the anti-immigration- and other debates.

Also in Sweden, a long period of Social Democratic rule (44 years), ended, around the time of the Danish and Norwegian landslide elections; more precisely in 1976. What followed were the typical Scandinavian short-term governments. SD sees the preservation of the welfare-model as the way to improve society. Their programme even mentions explicitly, that the party aims at “combining the best elements of the traditional rightist- and leftist- ideologies”. Under the heading ‘Demokrati’, they write about their support for more instances of direct democracy at local, regional and national levels (Sverigedemokraterna, 2017). Its proposed policies of increased public spending with no corresponding increase in public income, is in sharp contrast to the Norwegian FrP’s and the Danish DF’s libertarianism. However, the policy is more similar to the socio-economic policies of the DF that also see the safeguarding of the welfare system as a way to, ultimately, safeguard the national identity. Furthermore, the youth-organisation of the SD specifically mentions that it wishes to bring to full fruition the possibilities offered by Nordic collaboration: “We see ourselves, in order of importance, as a part of a Nordic, a European and a Western state. In line with this, we will work simultaneously to strengthen the Nordic identity as well as broaden and deepen Nordic collaboration” (15). As with the FrP, the SD after its foundation in 1988, was subject to a cordon sanitaire, both on the side of the political establishment, but also on the side of the media (16). In the landslide election of 1991, two new parties gained representation, one of which was the Ny Demokrati [NyD]. NyD was a party that took the FrP and DF’s as models. It was in favour of curtailing immigration, tax cuts, cuts on public services and increased opportunities for direct democratic participation. The party’s success was shortlived, as it already exited the Riksdag in the 1994 election. After the 1991 election, the political establishment on the political right could have chosen to cooperate with the new NyD. However, they preferred to form a four-party minority government instead. A pattern thus seems to develop which indicates that the political elite in Sweden, and to a smaller degree in Norway, seek an active policy of keeping the national-populist parties out of government office and, in the Swedish case, even out of a cooperative position (Sannerstedt, Sjölin, 1992, 107).

The images utilised to reinforce national sentiment in the Scandinavian countries are by no means restricted to the use made by the national-populist parties. The national-populists seem to promote ‘lateral ethnies’ in the sense of the image of a ‘golden age’ and a return to ‘romanticist images of nature’. However, they are not the only source of such images. On the contrary, this sort of
nationalist romanticism seems to be part of a much wider social code in Scandinavia. Internally in the region, there have been intensive national revivals against other states in the past (Sweden against Denmark; Denmark against Prussia; Norway against both Sweden and Denmark). Possibly the difference this time is that the revival is posed against ‘internal enemies’- thus the elites and the immigrants. Nationalism in Scandinavia is complicated by the extra layer of Scandinavian and Nordic regionalism. From what we have seen, it is typical for members of the national-socialist parties in Scandinavia to create an image of other Nordics as a kind of extended group of co-nationals. That Scandinavia, as a region which incorporates Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, compels a feeling of companionship and belonging even down to the level of each individual is due to the shared linguistic background of the region. The communality of this background is sustained through initiatives by the Nordic Council’s Cultural Secretariat, which has been successful in obtaining the agreement of the different national broadcasting services to show a certain amount of hours of television, either in the language of one of the other Nordic countries, which means Scandinavia and Finland, or about one of the countries. Furthermore, at the traditional Folk High Schools that are typically found dotted in the rural areas in all of the Scandinavian countries, as well as in retirement homes, youth and the elderly may indulge in singing each morning from the Danske Hoejskole Sangbog which, with some exceptions, consists of nationalistic or Protestant songs from the three main Scandinavian countries, so the population may get to know, and try their best at pronouncing, all of the languages and dialects of the region.

Conclusion

We may, on the basis of our study, conclude that there are two main types of national-populist party in Scandinavia; the first type was founded in Denmark as the DFrP, but quickly established a parallel in Norway (the FrP) and was later joined by the NyD in Sweden. There is only a narrow basis on which to call these parties populist, namely the fact that their anti-bureaucatic ideals are somehow an expression of anti-elitism. However, from the moment they adopted anti-immigration rhetoric and thus combining their libertarian idea with a nationalist ideology, they became national-populist. The later DFrP, the DF, and the DS are similar in that their ideological stance is not libertarian, but neither do they belong to any fixed point on the left-right divide. They see it as their prerogative to combine policies as they wish. The danger, which the DF was quick in recognizing and circumventing, is that the political establishment will keep the party outside the sphere of influence, such as it happened in Norway and even more so in Sweden. A remedy against this danger which the DF quickly found, is to choose the combination of ideological ideals the party will pursue and stick with it, thus creating a relatively stable electoral basis. As a result, the DF has gained much more influence than both the DFrP and the DS did. Certainly, the fact that the political establishment had already had luck in creating a corde sanitaire around the DS made it difficult for the NyD to get a foothold. Overall, we may say that in the three Scandinavian countries, the tendency towards more minority governments has been uniform in direction, but different in strength. In fact, we may conclude that there is some ground for claiming that there is a special Scandinavian model. This model consists in a combination of a strong welfare-state and a high level of regional integration, thorough cultural exchange, and similarity of languages and, to some extent, a shared history. These are promoted through the activities of the Nordic Council. In other words, it is promoted by the national assemblies of all the Nordic countries. However, in spite of the many similarities, and although some
of the populist parties in these countries share key ideological points, they are never completely coordinated. Especially when studied over the course of time, one can identify different streams and, especially, significant transformations within each country as well as within most of these parties. There has been a general movement towards what we have defined as national-populist policies. We thus question the ‘saga’ of Scandinavia-wide uniformity of political systems and political ideologies, at least as far as national-populism is concerned.

* This paper is largely drawn from parts of the doctoral dissertation Historical and Doctrinal Roots of Scandinavian National-Populism (2018) by the same author.

Notes

(1) At one point in the campaign, this strategy seemed to be successful enough to provide Mr. Paludan with a seat in parliament which, in the end, he did not gain.

(2) Margaret Canovan pointed out that whoever has used the word ‘populism’ has also been able to attach to it a variety of meanings. “The more flexible the word has become”, the English political theorist noted, “the more tempted political scientists have been to label ‘populist’ any movement or outlook that does not fit into any established category” (Canovan, 1981, p. 3, 16).

(3) Also Luca Scuccimarra has written with considerable insight into the relationship between populist forces and democracy (Scuccimarra, 2017). Scuccimarra relies on the work of Reinhart Koselleck in emphasising the constitutive polyvocality of the basic concepts of politics (Koselleck, 1979).

(4) The relationship with different political forces of the past and present has been explored by several different authors (Armellini, 2015; Hansen, 2018).

(5) On example of such a broad definition of populism has been advanced by Ivan Cerovac. More specifically, he juxtaposed a system where the role of experts in a decision-making process is emphasized (elitism) and a system where “a capable and considered population” should have equal access to all aspects of the decisionmaking process (populism) (Cerovac, 2014).

(6) Although interest-specific farmers’parties never emerged on any scale in Denmark and Iceland, the Agrarian Liberals, Venstre, in Denmark and the Progressive Party, Frámsöknarflokkurinn in Iceland have relied above all on agricultural support. Although the Danish Venstre once was an outspoken agrarian party, it has let its past image go, in favour of a simpler, Liberal stance (Arter, 1984, p. 23).

(7) By extreme is meant that the government represented only a very small number of seats in Folketinget.

(8) One of the provocative suggestions Mogens Glistrup made in those years was to dismantle the Department of Defence completely and put it in its place an answering machine with the recorded message ‘we surrender’ in Russian.

(9) This party is often referred to in English as Danish People’s Party, but this does not render justice to the Danish understanding of the prefix ‘Folke’, which means ‘of the people’.

(10) Translation by the author from Dansk Folkeparti, 2009.

(11) Small nation-states have the advantage, from a nationalist point-of-view, that the number of citizens is quite small. If we look at Iceland, which is a clear example of a small nation-state, within which the citizens speak a language which is not spoken anywhere else in the world, the shared space is known to each and every individual citizen, and the country has its own values, traditions and traditional pre-christian popular beliefs. In addition, the country has a history of being subdued to another state. These conditions make it easy to create a bond among the Icelandic population, which can quite clearly designate the national ethnic group. The level of homogeneity is simply so high that every question with any cultural, linguistic, historical, economic or geographical implications will, necessarily be interpreted in a nationalist key. That is not to say that the Icelandics are particularly hostile towards other ethnicities. This lack of aggressivity is determined by the absence of external threats in the form of foreign states, of internal threats, such as high numbers of immigrants and of class conflict.

(12) An illustration is the question which Henrik Brodersen (DF), asked the Danish Minister of Culture, Per Stig Møller, on 23rd of October 2017. In his question, Brodersen shows concern because, in his opinion, the Danish Broadcasting service had not been screening enough television programmes from the other Nordic
countries, or the other countries within the realm. Translated by the author from Brodersen, 2010.

(13) For example, Denmark now has a ministry dedicated to immigration and integration and a ban on forced
matrimony, the so-called 24-rule. Dansk Folkeparti proposed amendments to the Law on Parliamentary Elections
to stop members of Folketinget who are residents elsewhere in the country from receiving an accommodation
allowance for the purpose of purchasing temporary accommodation in the Capital. Eventually, the amendment was
passed with a unanimous vote in favour (Dansk Folkeparti’s Folketingsgruppe, 2013-14, L 29).

(14) Another, recent Danish mini-series fostering lateral nationalism was about the second Dano-Prussian
War in 1864. The series was also state funded and is entitled “1864”. The series, rightly, points out the strong
nationalistic feeling that spiralled out of proportion when the past greatness of the Kingdom of Denmark and
the victory of one military battle against Prussia were taken as signs of the invincible Danish fortress. The
national history books depict the 1864 defeat as something unexpected and unjust, whereas, with a minimal
sense of military realism, the outcome was very much predictable at the hands of the much superior and more
numerous Prussian forces. Nevertheless, the nationalistic inspiration of several of the most influential Danish
political leaders, their idea of the superiority of constitutional monarchy, and their belief in the Danish people
as chosen by God, at the time contributed to a sense of potency and infallibility of the nation.

(15) Translated by the author from Unga svenskar, 2017.

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